Attack, Attack, Attack
Information Operations:
Multi-national Division Baghdad (4th Infantry Division)
December 2007 to February 2009
by
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Editor's Note: Lieutenant Colonel Zimmerman's contribution on IO during a specific time in the Iraq conflict highlights the evolving nature of IO in support of counter-insurgency operations. His views and experiences are very important to the evolving discussion of communications in the modern era of conflict.

> *Insurgents have an additional advantage in shaping the information environment. Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds; insurgents, on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and point out government shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency.*
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> *US Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, p 1-3.*

Despite the Coalition's technological superiority and readily available funding for counterinsurgency efforts, in December 2007, the leaders of the numerous insurgent groups and Al Qaeda still maintained a significant advantage over Coalition Forces in the information environment within Baghdad. The story of insurgent and Al Qaeda escalation of carnage and death within Baghdad was instantaneously transmitted worldwide by the international media. This advantage enabled these groups to have and maintain the initiative. As a result, Coalition Forces in Baghdad, represented primarily by Multi-National Division Baghdad (MND-B), struggled with how to first degrade and ultimately eradicate the enemy's significant advantage in the information environment. In December 2007, Information Operations (IO) was executed utilizing a clearly doctrinal approach. MND-B adapted and adopted a new line of attack towards the execution of IO. This article focuses on the story of the MND-B Commander's understanding of that problem set. How he operationalized IO through command emphasis and his vision of a series of key innovations best characterized as massed IO effects using a new line of attack he described as a "*flashlight"* approach to achieve information superiority.

Command Emphasis and Information Operations "Attack – Attack – Attack"

There was an aggressive, clear and strong command emphasis by the MND-B Commander to integrate and operationalize IO at all levels of command during Operation Iraqi Freedom 07-09. To achieve information superiority as outlined in FM 3-13 Information Operations, the Commander focused all MND-B efforts to the improvement of Coalition Forces' operational picture and accepted risk in order to get messaging out quickly. Concurrently, MND-B affected Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Special Group Criminals (SGC) and other targeted enemy networks' battlefield perceptions in a way that led them to make decisions favoring Coalition Forces.

The MND-B CG devoted a significant amount of time to the integration of IO into the lethal targeting process. The G7 was required to brief IO support to lethal targeting during the two targeting huddles daily in the Commander's office. A Brigade Combat Team Commander, best surmised this command emphasis when he stated; "There was a common mindset in MND-B – ATTACK. There was no defensive mindset. We executed IO attacks, which created an offensive mindset." This command emphasis was a critical contributing factor, which enabled MND-B to protect the Iraqi populace and significantly increase the security of both the Iraqi population and Coalition Forces throughout Baghdad by November 2008. In early 2008, acknowledging that there was limited IO capacity, MND-B quickly transitioned from a decentralized to centralized command-and-control approach. The apportionment of the limited IO resources in Baghdad became a MND-B Commander level command-and-control function. Though the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) were the decisive units, they required division command-and-control to achieve unity of effort across the multiple lines of efforts and against multiple non-contiguous threats.

Sensing a change in the MND-B operational environment in February 2008, the Commander directed the G2 to conduct a focused and detailed analysis of both the AQI and SGC Networks operating within the Baghdad operational environment. This analysis refined the target sets and established new targeting guidance to the BCTs. The primary MND-B mission was to protect the Iraqi population. Based on this mission and refined targeting guidance the IO was adjusted to focus on informing the Baghdad population of imminent threats such as suicide vests and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) attacks and disrupting AQI Support Zones. Over the coming months, the MND-B Commander directed a series of operations and innovations to leverage all IO assets and capabilities in an effort to effectively saturate the Baghdad Information Environment with the Coalition Force and Government of Iraq message. This series of operations and innovations enabled the disruption of both the AQI and

SGC Networks, effective protection of the Baghdad population, and helped set the conditions for peaceful January 2009 Iraqi elections.

Re-organizing Information Operations to Meet the Needs of the Commander

The U.S. Army operated, organized and resourced the tactical level to execute IO based on previous assumptions, capabilities and levels of usage in the battlespace. Recent MTOE changes have further reduced the Division FA30 from eight to five officers. MND-B quickly learned that the MTOEs for both the Division and Brigade Combat Teams did not provide adequate personnel for the Division G7 or BCT S7s. MND-B IO assets required significant augmentation and reorganization to achieve the commander's vision. This included innovations in the structure and function of the MND-B G7 and Brigade Combat

Teams' S7 sections in order to increase capacity as well as apply new approaches to messaging in support of both lethal and non-lethal operations. The MND-B Chief of Staff approved a significant increase in the number of personnel dedicated to IO at the Division, BCT, and Battalion levels. In December 2007, the 4ID G7 deployed with an eleven-man cell, which was expanded to a 36-man cell during this reorganization. Officers and NCOs within the MND-B Headquarters were reassigned to the G7 section to meet mission requirements. The magnitude of the emphasis placed on IO as demonstrated by the Engagement and Targeting cells within the G7. The G7 Engagement cell grew from one Major to a twelve-man cell led by a Lieutenant Colonel. This expansion also included a political advisor, cultural advisor, Cultural/Political Assessment Cell (CPAC), and several IO contractors. The G7 also contracted additional positions

to include Engagement Coordinators for all the BCT S7 sections to assist with the ever-growing demand for engagement support.

The coordination between the G2 and G7 in MND-B intensified early in the deployment and was consistent and extremely close. The G2 support enabled a seamless integration of IO into overall targeting efforts. Because the IO Targeting Cell was central to conducting IO in a counterinsurgency environment, MND-B established the cell directly in the G2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE). The G2 devoted significant ISR and analytical assets specifically to G7 intelligence requirements. The IO Targeting Cell initially consisted of one Major and evolved to one Major (FA30), one Captain (35D), one Sergeant (35F Intelligence Analyst), and one civilian contractor serving as an intelligence analyst. The IO Targeting Cell's purpose


Manning	MTOE 7.0	Deployed w/ 4ID	MND-B Actual
Officer	9	6	13
NCO	3	5	7
EM	0	2	2
Civilian	0	0	14
Totals:	12	11	36

Figure 1 - Task Organization (16 Dec 2008)
MND Bagdad

was to provide intelligence support for IO in support of Division operations. The cell accomplished this by providing support to lethal and non-lethal operations; information for the production of PSYOP products or details about target audiences; by monitoring all intelligence reporting for information illustrating the effectiveness of on-going IO; and by identifying individuals or groups with susceptibilities that could be exploited through future IO efforts. In this manner, the information provided by the cell's efforts drove the following processes: IO individual and area target selections, PSYOP product production, and IO Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) evaluation.

The side-by-side interaction of the G2 and G7 targeting personnel enabled effective IO targeting operations that were nested and mutually supporting of lethal enemy network targeting operations. This close integration between intelligence and IO personnel made it possible for the commander to leverage IO to successfully disrupt enemy networks and set the conditions for security improvements in Baghdad. MND-B had effectively operationalized the IO targeting process and broken new ground in how to leverage intelligence support for IO.

Leveraging Information Operations

The establishment of a thriving IO targeting cell increased the pressure to find effective ways to execute IO shaping operations that would set the conditions on the ground and in the information environment to defeat the insurgency and AQI. The basic steps of targeting remain the same in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. MND-B learned two significant lessons -the positive effect on security by keeping the Iraqi population informed of threats and using IO to generate intelligence on networks or individual targets. In the COIN environment within Baghdad, IO-targeting improved security by (1) protecting the local populace by informing the populace of developing and imminent threats; and (2) executing shaping operations to increase intelligence gathering in order to facilitate time sensitive targeting of high value targets within a network.

In December 2007 MND-B was executing what can best be described as a "spotlight approach" to IO. At the tactical level, MND-B was executing IO focused on positive messaging with the Iraqi population as the primary target audience. Messaging was spread across the large urban geographic area consisting of the MND-B area of operation (AO). This "spotlight approach" was best characterized as IO executed over a large geographic location with a large and mixed target audience. The overall effects of messaging was diluted with little intensity in any specific situation or location. MND-B Commander quickly determined that the "spotlight approach" did not effectively focus the limited IO resources or capacity on problem areas. This approach achieved marginal to limited success in the MND-B information environment. The MND-B Commander realized that IO could not focus everywhere and on everything. The scope of the MND-B's IO plan had to be narrowed and focused to maximize all available resources. Rather than utilizing a spotlight, one should use a flashlight that is turned on at a specific location for a specific duration and then turned off

and moved to another location where it is then turned on again when targeting. These specific locations for IO were tactical areas of interest (TAIs) developed in conjunction with the G2. TAIs enabled the MND-B Commander to focus his limited IO capacity at the critical time and location of his choosing. A continuous series of IO attacks using the flashlight approach reduced the terrorist and insurgent networks' information advantage. The flashlight approach enabled MND-B to focus limited resources to gain information superiority in locations of the Commanders choosing. This revolutionary technique proved quite successful in practice in Baghdad.

Although not discussed in any further detail in this paper, the use of Military Deception (MILDEC) was a force multiplier and essential for IO planning. The MND-B Commander's foresight allowed IO planners to use creativity and ingenuity to deceive enemy decision makers, creating tensions between enemy nodes and increasing the fog of war from their perspective. This additional tool enhanced targeting efforts that led to kill/capture opportunities and disruption of enemy lethal activities.

Protecting the Iraqi Population: Rapid Reaction Packets of "Inform" Products

Informing the Iraqi populace of imminent and developing threats such as suicide vest (SVEST) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) significantly degraded the enemy's information advantage in the MND-B operational environment. MND-B's aggressive use of prepositioned rapid reaction packets of "inform" products targeting suicide vest and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices prevented the enemy from leveraging their superior knowledge of rumors among the population.

This enduring operation throughout OIF 07-09 sought to mitigate developing and imminent AQI signature attacks based on available intelligence. In order to prevent or mitigate these attacks, messaging focused on demonizing known AQI leaders while also alerting the populace to signs of a potential SVEST or VBIED attack. Messaging was disseminated rapidly through leaflet drops and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) led handbill

Figure 2 - Suicide Vest Warning Handbill

dissemination operations.

Although a short duration operation, these actions prevented many possible attacks from taking place to include an attack on the Khadamiyah Shrine that took place during the operation's first day of execution. Throughout this period, attack totals were lower than in previous years and the Iraqi populace's perception of this operations' messaging was positive. Rapidly informing the Iraqi population of emerging threats in a focused, timely manner proved an effective way to protect the populace and disrupt enemy decision cycles by denying them freedom of movement and action around potential attack sites. Another critical lesson learned during these operations is that ISF-led dissemination of products increased the credibility of the message and was a contributing factor in the increased professionalism of the ISF over time.

Demonizing AQI
Operation Loyal Strike

Operation Loyal Strike (1-21 February 2008) targeted a specific AQI network operating within the MND-B OE. This operation was the first focused "demonizing" IO driven operation conducted by the 4ID during OIF 07-09. Messaging focused on demonizing specific AQI leaders as well as the entire network in order to drive a wedge between them and the populace. This was the first time the G7 worked closely with the G2 to develop specific targeted areas of interest (TAIs). The intent of developing TAIs was to enable MND-B to maximize its limited IO capacity to effectively message all target audiences and prevent dilution of the message in

Figure 3 - AQI Demonizing Product

all the background noise of a counterinsurgency environment.

Messaging media used in this operation consisted primarily of handbills, posters, and loudspeaker broadcasts. It is significant to note that the volume disseminated far exceeded that of any other IO conducted in the Baghdad operational environment (OE) during the previous year.

However, the volume of IO was more concentrated and the volume of IO products exceeded prior operations; when compared to later operations conducted by the Division it was very limited. Despite the fact that this operation was limited, it was nonetheless important since it proved that saturation of identified TAIs is an effective way to ensure targeted individuals receive the desired message. As this operation concluded, the AQI elements in the East Mansour area were disrupted due to the capture of one prominent local AQI leader and the killing of another AQI leader within the network. A significant lesson from this operation was that IO was seamlessly integrated with lethal targeting to create intelligence, effect a target's decision cycle, and turn TAIs into non-permissive terrain, thus limiting a target's freedom of movement. The lessons from this operation were incorporated into future, larger scale operations such as Ironhorse Fortitude, Sadr City, and Ironhorse Blizzard. This operation laid the groundwork for the flashlight approach to IO utilizing IO TAIs and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) based on volume, saturation, and speed.

Testing the Flashlight Approach
Operation Ironhorse Fortitude

Operation Ironhorse Fortitude (20 February to 7 March 2008) targeted specific SGC in East and West Rashid, Sadr City, and Adhamiyah of Baghdad. The Commander's desired goal for Ironhorse Fortitude was to disrupt SGC networks by creating actionable intelligence and facilitating time sensitive targeting of identified SGC leaders. This

Figure 3 - AQI Demonizing Product

operation marked a significant increase in the quantity of products produced and disseminated. During this operation the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) disseminated over 100,000 handbills, 20,000 copies of the Baghdad Now newspaper, and 5,000 wanted posters. Loudspeaker operations, daily radio announcements and press releases targeting SGC leaders were also regularly released during this operation. Simultaneously, targeted individuals within the Iraqi population were used to transmit truthful information that created distrust and increased uncertainty within each targets' networks.

This operation proved to be one of the first to effectively disrupt SGC networks throughout Baghdad and especially in Baghdad's Bayaa Belidayah. Demonization of identified SGC group leaders was conducted with focused messaging via handbills, loudspeakers, radio, and press releases, was the base line for all future MND-B IO using the flashlight approach. Furthermore, this operation demonstrated that the conditions in the MND-B OE were set for disrupting SGC networks using the flashlight approach.

Maximizing IO Capacity
Sadr City

The fight for Sadr City was encapsulated in a series of operations covered by multiple orders, but all focused on the same objective - to defeat the SGC in Sadr City. In order to restore the rule-of-law in Eastern Baghdad and increase Government of Iraq and ISF legitimacy, Sadr City operations began in March 2008. Through the conduct of a massive information attack in Sadr City, MND-B regained the information advantage over SGCs. This information attack saturated Sadr City's operational environment with an unprecedented volume of products

over a thirty-day period. MND-B focused all available IO capabilities on enemy networks hiding among the Iraqi population in Sadr City.

Following Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's declaration to restore the rule-of-law in Sadr City, MND-B exploited the GOI's posturing by working with the ISF to conduct their own leaflet drops and by following up their leaflet drops with massive CF fixed and rotary wing leaflet drops. Key Leader Engagements helped to communicate CF and GOI intentions in Sadr City throughout the process of improving the quality of life for local Iraqis.

As the ISF moved into Sadr City, additional copies of the Baghdad Now were disseminated in areas where the fighting had quieted down in order to provide residents with accurate information instead of SGC propaganda. Messages stressing GOI / ISF's legitimacy and SGC illegitimacy were also delivered through radio public service announcements (PSAs). These PSAs were broadcast by local Iraqi radio stations and Coalition Force controlled and owned "radio-in-the-boxes." In addition to the media already mentioned, Tactical Psychological Operations Teams conducted loudspeaker messaging on the periphery and later in Sadr City's Southern section. As a further means of communicating GOI / ISF intentions to Sadr City residents, 12 billboards were installed in Sadr City during May and June, which were later followed by even more new billboards in the following months. Numerous

Figure 5 - Handbill Dissemination in Sadr City

sources to include information gathered during key leader engagements showed that the populace perceived the new billboards as a sign of increased security. Executed through various media types, all Sadr City shaping operations focused on "demonizing" identified SGCs and increasing GOI / ISF legitimacy through the rule-of-law's restoration in this formerly extremist controlled section of Baghdad.

During the large-scale operations to shape Sadr City's Information Environment, it was initially difficult to gauge the effect upon local residents' perceptions. However, by July it was clear that CF messaging not only supported ground


Figure 6 - Sadr City Shaping Operations (May 2008)

operations effectively by helping to minimize civilian causalities, but also that throughout Sadr City residents understood and usually welcomed the increased ISF presence. With the ISF's gradual removal of criminals from the area, Sadr City residents were slowly freed from extremist extortion. This resulted in residents finding CF messaging more credible than criminal messaging claiming the ISF's action was an "occupation."

This operation validated the IO methods used by MND-B and reinforced the fact that a "flashlight" approach to IO utilizing massive message saturation focused on targeted areas was effective in changing a population's perceptions. Of the methods that supported the "flashlight" approach, ISF-led handbill dissemination proved extremely effective when used in conjunction with targeted leaflet drops. Such dissemination forced the ISF to interact with local residents, which improved the GOI's relationship with the populace.

Many non-IO trained professionals worry about "over-saturating" a targeted audience with messaging because of potential resistance to future messaging. Although logical, overall this argument proved false during Baghdad's Sadr City shaping operations. It is true that some residents complained about the volume of leaflets dropped over Sadr City, but this reaction is no different than Americans complaining about excessive advertising. In both cases, target audiences acted upon the very messaging they complained about; the latter through increasingly supporting the GOI and the lesser through their purchasing behavior. Even if the people do not like being deluged with

Figure 5 - AQI Demonizing Banners

messaging, the key is achieving message exposure. If understood, any message will elicit a response and serve to influence even the most hostile audiences. The amount of influence varies with the audience and messaging approach, but without basic message communication, influence cannot be consistently achieved or maintained.

Another key to the successful IO messaging conducted in Sadr City was the close link between actions on the ground and messaging. Within days of residents reading leaflets demonizing local criminals and advising locals to stay out of the ISF's way as they reestablish the rule-of-law, residents actually saw the ISF search neighborhoods for criminals resulting in their death or capture. Follow-on messaging highlighted security and essential service (ES) improvements, which were tied to other tangible actions by the GOI / ISF in the area.

Information Operations conducted to shape Sadr City not only led to the successful reestablishment of the rule-of-law in the area, but also demonstrated three important principles for conducting IO in general. First, message saturation does work when it is more critical for target audiences to get your message and less critical how they get it. Second, it is vital to tie messaging to actions on the ground in order for it to be viewed as credible and possibly even of local origin. Third, the more message dissemination can be viewed as local in origin often times the more credible that message will appear. Conducting IO is an art, but even in art there are characteristics that set masters apart from novices. The outcome of operations in one of the most dangerous areas clearly argues that the three principles above represent some of the most effective IO TTPs used in support of combat operations.

Sustained Disruption of Special Group Criminal Networks
Operation Ironhorse Tempest

Operation Ironhorse Tempest (1 June to 30 October 2008) targeted Special Group Criminals throughout the MND-B OE with focused efforts in Sadr City.

Designed to prevent SGC from returning to traditional support zones as well as making conditions unbearable for SGC remaining in these areas, the goal of this operation was to expedite the GOI and ISF's ability to protect the population, decrease attacks on Coalition Forces, and defeat the SGC networks throughout the MND-B OE. As this operation progressed, the reduction of accelerant movement into the AO was added in order to further deny SGC networks the supplies they needed in order to conduct attacks.

This operation leveraged even more tools to shape the MND-B Information Environment (IE) than previous operations to include handbills, posters, banners, Baghdad Now newspaper articles, loud speaker broadcasts, metal signs on t-walls, radio broadcasts, billboards, press releases, and terrestrial television public service announcements. Print products were disseminated in conjunction with the Iraqi Army and police and the Sons of Iraq at checkpoints and on patrols through known SGC support zones.

MND-B messaging also targeted foreign-trained SGC leaders to drive a wedge between them and the populace by heightening the populace's awareness of SGC criminality, their ties to foreign influence and their disobedience to mainstream Jaish al Mahdi (JAM). Additionally, messaging throughout the OE exploited weapons cache discoveries, ISF criminal captures, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and economic developments while still mitigating enemy spectacular attacks or propaganda. Key leader engagements (KLE) were closely tied in to support this operation by opening communication with civilian leaders in SGC support zones. This operation took the flashlight approach to IO, first pioneered in Operation Ironhorse Fortitude, to new levels of effectiveness by incorporating more media forms and synchronizing KLE with this operation. Consequently, SGC suffered a significant decrease in active and passive support throughout Baghdad while positive perceptions of ISF performance and GOI

capability continued to increase among the populace due to these information operations.

Everything to Include the Kitchen Sink
Operation Ironhorse Blizzard

Operation Ironhorse Blizzard (25 August to 30 November 2008) targeted enemy network leaders throughout the MND-B OE. This operation represented the ultimate combination of IO, Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires, Public Affairs Operations, and intelligence assets working together to capture, kill, or disrupt extremists within the MND-B OE. Operation Ironhorse Blizzard broke new ground in using focused IO to pressure multiple enemy networks simultaneously in conjunction with other battlefield enablers. This operation resulted in the execution of 108 IO CONOPs over the span of 138 days resulting in 17 High Value Individuals (HVI) captured or killed, 42 other targets fleeing Iraq from fear of death or capture, and all targeted criminal networks becoming severely disrupted.

As in previous operations, this operation used the flashlight approach with messaging being delivered using leaflets, handbills, posters, billboards, radio broadcasts, terrestrial television public service announcements and key leader engagements. This focused messaging disrupted enemy support zones and prevented SGCs from returning to the AO. This disruption and the time gained by preventing SGCs from returning enabled the GOI and ISF to take the lead in protecting the populace. Operation Ironhorse Blizzard accelerated conditions for the defeat of criminal networks throughout the MND-B OE. Although most emphasis was placed on defeating SGC, AQI Leadership was also targeted throughout this operation to further degrade their operation capacity already greatly reduced in some areas by previous operations like Operation Loyal Strike.

Messaging in support of this operation was disseminated in TAIs in the form of over 20,071,000 leaflets dropped from fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 2,789,004 handbills disseminated by Iraqi Security Forces, 2,450,000 issues of the Baghdad Now newspaper, 171,600 wanted posters hung throughout Baghdad, 631,000 tip cards, and 66 new billboards contracted and constructed. Additionally, in support of Operation Ironhorse Blizzard, the MND-B Public Affairs produced press releases with photos of suspected criminals and/or terrorists listing their alleged crimes. To further reinforce the effort, operational press release boiler plates were used to reinforce our efforts to bring wanted criminals/terrorists to justice by asking the Iraqi people to call in tips on established hotlines. Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces displayed wanted posters during joint press conferences and media events to highlight a team effort. This operation demonstrated the relevance of IO's contributions as a potent enabler whose application supports more than just "good news" type operations like humanitarian aid distribution. In this operation, IO directly supported lethal targeting and made a definitive impact on targeted networks. The results generated by Operation Ironhorse Blizzard contributed greatly in shaping

Figure 6 - Ironhorse Blizzard Leaflet Drop October 2008

favorable conditions in Baghdad for the January 2009 Iraqi Provincial Council elections.

Non-lethal Terrain Denial Operations

These operations used a mixture of essential service (ES) improvement projects, security operations and IO to deny enemy networks freedom of movement and action in targeted areas. Many of these areas include some of Baghdad's formerly poorest neighborhoods that once provided fertile recruiting areas and support zones for both terrorist and insurgent networks. The key to these operations' success is the use of IO to tie security and essential services improvements directly to the GOI and ISF through focused messaging. By using this multi-faceted approach to degrade populace support for the enemy and target AQI and SGC networks, security was improved in all areas of targeted non-lethal operations.

Not only was IO used to demonize but it was also utilized to expose other ways for the Iraqi population to gain enlightenment an alternative to violence. Messaging in support of this operation was tied directly to physical improvements on the ground like the greater availability of clean water or fewer civilian deaths due to criminal attacks. Press releases and increased coverage of improved conditions supported IO objectives. Handbills, leaflets, radio broadcasts, posters, terrestrial television public service announcements and billboards were standard means of communicating our desired message in targeted areas to inform and influence the populace.

As with other operations, BCTs ensured handbill dissemination was conducted by local ISF units to increase the products' credibility and further improve upon positive perceptions of the ISF in these areas. By limiting these operations' focus area and tying messaging directly to physical actions on the ground, these operations proved effective in preventing criminals from returning to these areas and limiting or eliminating the operational capacity of criminals already in these areas. Though IO is not the only enabler that makes these operations possible, it is the enabler which linked all other enablers' effects in these operations to achieve the operations' common goals

and message. Positive messaging focused on the populace combined with key leader engagements resulted in significant improvements in the Baghdad populace's perceptions of the Iraqi Army and National Police.

Conclusion

The significant IO lessons learned by the 4th Infantry Division as the Multi-national Division Baghdad during OIF 07-09 were (1) to mass IO effects using a "flashlight approach," (2) IO is an essential element of the targeting process, (3) a proactive approach requires IO to lead all planning, (4) IO was effective for exploiting enemy networks, (5) key leader engagements are an essential component of IO, (6) leaflet drops are effective in permissive terrain, (7) Military Deception (MILDEC) is an integral part of IO plans, (8) rapid dissemination information/warning products should be prepositioned at the lowest level possible, (9) Close integration of the G2 and G7 is essential for successful IO, and (10) combined IO increases credibility to messaging. The methods developed by 4ID in support of both lethal and non-lethal targeting proved successful in Iraq. The Commanding General's emphasis on IO was an essential component of the overall success of MND-B operations. A heightened level of command emphasis on IO must be a priority in a counterinsurgency environment. Furthermore, this command emphasis must aggressively be passed to BCT Commanders and synchronized and coordinated across the division by the G7.

At the conclusion of 4ID's service as the MND-B headquarters, the Division's method of massing IO effects to attack and maintain pressure on targeted networks resulted in over 700 leaflet drops, 15 Iraqi leaflet drops, 47 million leaflets, 183 million handbills, 400 billboards, and 1.2 million posters. This massed yet focused IO effect or "flashlight approach" where

volume, frequency, and duration of non-lethal attacks mattered, was demonstrably effective in exploiting and diminishing enemy networks.